INTRODUCTION
Few, if any, contemporary settlement processes designed to resolve long-running ethnic or communal conflicts can be understood without reference to their deep historical roots, and the Northern Ireland case is no exception. This essay has as its starting point the argument that the origins of the Northern Ireland conflict fall into three temporally distinct phases. The The first section of this essay traces the multi-phased origins of conflict; the second shows how this contributed to the formation of communities constituted in a complex way, with multiple aims; and the third section outlines the settlement reached in 1998 and assesses how far it meets the demands of the parties and addresses the key problems at each level of conflict.
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THE GENESIS OF THE CONFLICT
Three temporally distinct origins of the conflict in Northern Ireland may, then, be identified:
seventeenth century plantation, early twentieth century partition, and late twentieth century mobilization and counter-mobilization over reform. At each stage, initiating events created a particular socio-structural configuration that "locked-in" a propensity for conflict in a pathdependent way, defining a set of protagonists with conflicting interests and more or less defined aims, and leading to a period-specific form of conflict. While it was possible that the later phases could have radically changed, or indeed undone, the form of conflict set in place with the plantation, the tendency at each new phase was instead to further specify, define and intensify the earlier patterns of conflict. Each phase sets a structural level of conflict: the earlier communal struggle does not go away but remains the base and everyday level of a conflict which may be fought in the name of nationalism and intensified by violence and threat of violence, but which is motivated by a much wider and deeper range of interests and values. Dispute over identity, aims and the very nature of the conflict becomes endemic to the actors in the conflict: the very range of interests, identities and repertoires of conflict provides a rationale for almost all the population to take sides. 
Seventeenth-century plantation and its legacy
Ireland, conquered in the twelfth century by the Anglo-Normans, had a socio-political structure that was resistant to the state-building and modernising efforts of the early modern English monarchs. Ulster, the most Northern and most Gaelic province, was particularly difficult to bring under the new English order. 4 Plantation (colonisation of confiscated land by loyal settlers) had been tried, relatively unsuccessfully, in other parts of Ireland in the sixteenth century. It was imposed on a larger scale on Ulster in the early seventeenth century: vast tracts of land were distributed to English companies, and to English and Scottish settlers brought in to work it. 5 The conflict in what is now Northern Ireland lies in a direct line of descent from this English reconquest and colonisation (plantation) of Ulster.
Colonisation was never separable from religious differences. Counter-reformation, via Irish priests trained on the continent, came to Ireland before the English reformation had taken hold, so that by the early seventeenth century, when the bulk of plantation took place, religious conflict was already under way. 6 Colonisation required settlers who were not just ethnically distinct (English and Scots), but also distinct in respect of religion (Protestants).
Subsequent power relations were tied around the religious distinction, legally in the "penal laws" directed against Catholics, informally in Protestant resistance to reform. The result was a multi-level conflict, where power relations (expressed in military force, economic resources, class position, legal status and political representation) were partially organised by formal This created a strong tendency towards a triangular form of conflict typical of the colonial period where the English/British state was a key player in securing the dominance of the "settlers" even if, by the eighteenth century, the latter had developed their own distinctive political agenda. 8 To put the point crudely, Protestants had a vital interest in retaining their possessions and security against resentful majoritarian Catholics, and relied on alliance with the state to do so; Catholics had an interest in undoing the power imbalance and multiple oppressions they suffered, and were indifferent as to whether this meant that just the British state or also the Protestant people had to go. 9 The British state soon became relatively indifferent to the religio-cultural character of its supporters in Ireland (by the eighteenth century it had an interest in conciliating the Irish majority, not least because it needed recruits to the navy). However its overriding interest was in stability, and this could best be guaranteed by alliance with the dominant, Protestant, partner.
The result was a multi-level communal conflict, where the precise role of religion, ethnicity or political loyalty varied over time and between subgroups. Religious difference did not map perfectly onto ethnic distinction. Catholics were of both "Old English" (Anglo-Norman) and Gaelic Irish provenance, and the class position and interests of each group in the early seventeenth century were quite distinct. Meanwhile, many of the seventeenth century incomers had only the vaguest concept of religion or religious distinction. 10 
Nineteenth century nationalist mobilization and twentieth century state-building
The Union of 1800 created a new political regime in Ireland, now subject directly to the Ireland of Union, and the best ways to increase Irish prosperity and to reduce sectarian division.
14 By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, nationalist ideology and grievance became superimposed upon the deeper communal oppositions. 15 The questions of how this happened, and whether it could have been avoided, lie beyond the scope of this paper. That it happened is clear. There were periods in the nineteenth century when Protestantsincluding Ulster Protestants -played a role in the nationalist movement, and in the latter quarter of the century the Irish Protestant Home Rule Association had significant Ulster Northern Ireland ver 4 -editor -6-membership. 16 Through the century, and even after nationalist politicization, many Catholics remained loyal to empire, if not to state. To be sure, this coexisted with continuing local communal division in Ulster, as Frank Wright has documented. 17 But it was only from 1885
(when the first "home rule" bill proposed devolved government for Ireland) that this communal division was politicised and came to be expressed in clear nationalist terms. 18 As a result of this, and of similar tensions over the second home rule bill (1893), which also failed to reach the statute book, Protestant dissent was silenced and, according to Northern nationalist leader, Tom Campbell, voting behaviour became entirely predictable by confessional allegiance. 19 As mobilization for and against the third home rule bill (1912) proceeded in the early twentieth century, ethnic, religious and political distinctions were forged into a coincidence. in the North -in using state resources in a clientelist way to secure Protestant unity. 21 Each state was used by the dominant political parties to create a world -a set of institutions manned by the dominant group and given meaning by their stories, norms, rituals -in which one group felt secure and the other was marginalised.
Partition had another effect. It massively increased the importance of sovereignty in Northern
Ireland. With another state in the archipelago, British sovereignty became much more important than before, and its importance was more deeply felt in Northern Ireland, where it was challenged, than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. Unionists needed the British state to protect them against a Catholic dominated society in the South, and they identified with the British state for a whole range of reasons -economic, religious and moral -which are not reducible simply to ethnic origin or national solidarity. 22 In summary, both Irish nationalists and Ulster unionists were formed in a process of mobilization and counter-mobilization in the late nineteenth century -a period when nationalism was strong throughout Europe. Irish nationalism is a paradigmatic case of Northern Ireland ver 4 -editor -7-peripheral nationalism successfully asserting itself against an old imperial centre. Ulster unionism unites ethnic, religious and political loyalties in a way that is sometimes defined as a form of ethno-national loyalty to "Britain". However, the ways in which the ethnic, religious, political and national categories were interrelated, and the motives that went into British loyalty, were considerably more diverse than those described in a classic nationalist model, or seen in the Irish nationalist paradigm.
Partition created the conditions for lasting conflict in Northern Ireland, institutionalising unionist majority power such that only unionists could be relied upon for loyalty to the state.
In effect it created a structural bind, in which nationalist equality came to threaten unionist security. 23 It became extremely difficult for unionist leaders -even liberal ones -to conceive of what was necessary to secure nationalist acquiescence, and those few who did were marginalised or defeated.
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The late twentieth century: a dynamic of violence
The third period saw the end of the devolved government put in place in 1921, as mobilization within Northern Ireland for civil rights met unionist opposition and produced nationalist (and later armed republican) responses. As the British state again took control, a quarter century of intense violence ensued, costing over 3,000 deaths, with the IRA effectively carrying on a guerilla campaign against the state, and indirectly against its Protestant supporters, while Protestant paramilitaries targetted Catholics. 25 The intense violence became self-perpetuating. The IRA gained a foothold in local communities, whose populations were targeted by loyalists, and many of whose members were harassed, intimidated and killed by the British army, but whose support for republicanism remained strong through the period. 26 The period also saw the creation of a British state apparatus of repression and administration in Northern Ireland, heavily reliant on Protestants in the security industry, which gave another experiential focus of British identification. at once made for deeper and more hard-fought opposition. What was at stake was power, but power for the sake of the very highest of values. What did the communities want? They had a whole range of varied aims, from the everyday to the religious to the geo-political, and on all of them they were opposed. 28 The "constitutional question" symbolized and crystallized all of these aspects, and that is why the issue of state sovereignty was so powerful a motivating force and so difficult to bypass.
Partition defined the two communities in opposing national and state-centric terms. As is well documented, the partition of Ireland and the formation of the Northern Ireland devolved institutions in 1921 was a product of unionist mobilization; the extent of the devolved territory was explicitly designed to produce a large unionist majority (approximately two thirds Protestant and one third Catholic). 29 The dominant party was the Ulster Unionist Party and it united the Protestant population through judicious use of state resources and opportunities. 30 It was opposed by a Catholic and nationalist population whose organisations and cultural reference points were lost with partition, and which only slowly reorganised politically under a Nationalist Party that was closely integrated in a church-dominated society. 31 The Nationalist party was unable to achieve any of its political goals, either when it participated as a minority within a parliament dominated by the unionist majority, or when it abstained from participation. There was also a small Labour party (and several republican-labour groupings), recruiting from both the Protestant and Catholic working class, and continually outmanoevred as a competitor for the Protestant vote by a Unionist party with state resources under its control. The party system was bi-polar, with all elections focused on the overarching unionist -nationalist opposition. Within this overarching division, each population was internally divided, and politically fractious. 32 The overarching division was defined in political -indeed constitutional -terms but fuelled by religious ethos, economic conditions and perceived injustice. More precisely, these motivations reinforced a national division which -for many -was of decreasing salience in the period after the second world war. By the 1960s, for example, many Catholics and "nationalists" were willing to settle, in the middle-term, for a reformed Northern Ireland. 33 Many Protestants and unionists were willing to contemplate closer relations with the Irish state and reform within Northern Ireland. 34 Divisions were increasingly visible within the Protestant population, while Catholics were increasingly impatient with the old nationalistCatholic consensus. 35 As the civil rights movement began, the motivations of different segments of the population were varied, and there seemed to be potential space for compromise. 36 However, conflict focused on the form and stability of the unionist devolved consensus. The DUP was eventually brought in, once it had electorally destroyed the more moderate UUP -but that took almost another decade.
The settlement was a complex package put together by the two governments and approved after amendments by the parties. 45 It had three strands -internal to Northern Ireland, North- Aside from these major institutional innovations, there were far-reaching reform policies involving the mainstreaming of equality in all public decision making and human rights guarantees (though the latter have yet to be fully codified). 47 There was agreement to institute an independent international commission on the reform of policing, with the remit to create a police service "capable of attracting and sustaining support from the community as a whole". When the Commission reported in 1999, it proposed a radical reorganization of the policing system, to intense unionist protest. 48 In addition, reform of the administration of From early in the conflict, Irish government officials and ministers had come to the conclusion that the three patterns were interrelated, that the partition settlement of 1920-21 had precluded any change in the long-term relationships of sectarian opposition, that this had created nationalist anger and alienation that made the IRA campaign possible, and that a new settlement had to address all three levels of conflict. 55 They disagreed on priorities and at government and official level had come to accept the interrelation of the three levels of conflict, and by the 1990s they had begun to converge in their views on the way forward with the Irish government. 57 Unionists, as Farrington points out in an important article, denied these interrelations. 58 They did not see the quest for a compromise political settlement as intimately connected with the quest to end IRA violence, nor did they think a fair settlement in Northern Ireland required any wider changes in the role of the state, except perhaps as a concomitant of wider global influences on a post-devolution United Kingdom
The 1998 Good Friday Agreement itself was open to these diametrically opposed unionist and nationalist interpretations. There was disagreement as to whether the Agreement was in essence an historic compromise, guaranteeing equality for nationalists and constitutional security for unionists. This was the view of the UUP leadership, with the fairness and balance of the compromise questioned by UUP rank and file and by the DUP. Most nationalists accepted that the Agreement was an historic compromise, but they thought it went further, to begin a process of dismantling the longer run causes of conflict. There was further disagreement as to whether paramilitary violence was to be read as a symptom of a longerterm pattern of relationships, which would be resolved only as these relations were changed (the view of nationalists, republicans and loyalists), or as an independent problem to be resolved prior to implementation of the Agreement (the view of both UUP and DUP).
Unionists and nationalists were, in addition, internally divided as to whether the Agreement actually resolved conflict at any of these levels. They were also divided on whether change had stabilised the balance of power or (as the DUP and UUP rank and file believed, and some republicans hoped) given a power bonus to nationalists who were likely to use it to further constitutional change. 
